Strategic Groups and State Capacity: The Case of the Private Entrepreneurs by Heberer, Thomas
 China Perspectives 
46 | march-april 2003
Varia
Strategic Groups and State Capacity: The Case of
the Private Entrepreneurs
Thomas Heberer
Édition électronique
URL : http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/255
DOI : 10.4000/chinaperspectives.255
ISSN : 1996-4617
Éditeur
Centre d'étude français sur la Chine contemporaine
Édition imprimée
Date de publication : 15 avril 2003
ISSN : 2070-3449
 
Référence électronique
Thomas Heberer, « Strategic Groups and State Capacity: The Case of the Private Entrepreneurs », 
China Perspectives [En ligne], 46 | march-april 2003, mis en ligne le 23 novembre 2006, consulté le 28
octobre 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/255  ; DOI : 10.4000/
chinaperspectives.255 
Ce document a été généré automatiquement le 28 octobre 2019.
© All rights reserved
Strategic Groups and State Capacity:
The Case of the Private
Entrepreneurs
Thomas Heberer
1 From the perspective of a centralised state,  state capacity refers to the capability a
state has to enforce political decisions. More recent approaches to defining this phrase
involve  deconstructing  the  concept  of  ‘state’  and  concentrating  on  the  interaction
between  state  and  society.  Actor-centred  institutionalism  assumes  that  social
phenomena are to be understood to be the product of interactions of intentional acts
between individual, collective or corporatist actors 1.  The relationship between state
and society is by no means merely a relationship between central state and the whole
of society, as both are subdivided on the vertical and horizontal levels. Thus, different
levels and organisations may have different capacities. It therefore appears practical to
conceive the state as an ensemble of various organisations interacting with society at
various levels 2. In this sense state capacity is much more shaped by inner tensions and
conflicts 3.
2 Frequently, the notion of capacity implies a perception of the state as a uniform and
homogeneous phenomenon. New approaches argue in a more differentiated way and
deconstruct  the  concept  of state  capacity.  “Capacity  for  what?”,  asks  Linda  Weiss,
arguing that a general notion of state capacity makes no sense, as states are stronger in
one area and weaker in others, thus, solely policy-oriented capacities do exist. State
capacity  is  not  primarily  the  capability  to  enforce  goals,  but  rather  has  to  be
comprehended  as  a  “product  of  institutions  governing  domestic  linkages”  4.  This
institutional approach was enhanced by Peter Evan's concept of embedded autonomy.
According to this concept, in order to achieve transformational goals, states are not
only successful if they act autonomously, they are also successful if this autonomy is
embedded  in  distinct  social  ties  linking  the  state  to  society,  thus  enabling  the
implementation of policies 5.
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3 In China, under present conditions of economic and social liberalisation that have led
to the emergence of new social groups and differentiated interests, state capacity, in
the  sense  of  organising  a  state,  requires  two further  elements,  which  are  urgently
demanded by various social groups: learning capabilities and bargaining competence.
Obviously, state capacity in China currently is more than power of enforcement, as it
also encompasses bargaining power. As far as the function of the state is concerned,
state capacity has increasingly to be comprehended as the capacity to incorporate new
social groups, associations and organisations into bargaining processes and to find a
balance between various particularistic interests.  State learning, i.e.  the conclusions
drawn by the state out of past mistakes and failures that might result in different or
improved policies  is  part  of  that  ability.  Hence  we may speak of  an adjustment  to
situational and political changes. Learning in this sense means finding new solutions
for  problems,  that  are  acceptable  to  state's  actors.  This  implies  various  stages  of
learning and various dimensions of learning processes 6. 
4 In this sense state capacity comprises the following elements (primarily in terms of
domestic political processes): Legitimacy in the sense of the legitimation of the political
system accepted by its citizens; regulating and controlling capacity in the sense of social
control und regulation; resources for enforcement (financial and coercive means as well as
personnel  resources);  bargaining  capacity,  i.e.  the  ability  to  incorporate  new  social
groups, associations and organisations into bargaining processes and to find a balance
between various particularistic interests; learning capacity, i.e. the ability to learn from
mistakes and failures.
5 If state capacity has to be discerned as part of an interaction relationship between state
and society, we may see two perspectives of that capacity: that of the state and that of
society or its actors. Such an understanding from “below” necessarily is interest-led
and tends to an articulation of interests. And interest articulation tends to influence
state capacities.  In this  article  this  will  be examined in the light of  the interaction
between  state  and  private  entrepreneurs  7.  We  argue  that  the  new  private
entrepreneurs  constitute  strategic  groups  with  distinct  interests  who  develop  a
transformational  as  well  as  strategic  potential.  In  turn  this  potential  affects  state
capacity.
6 The interrogation that  will  be  addressed is  whether  or  not  the  strategic  groups  of
entrepreneurs contribute significantly to the alteration of the structures and capacity
of  the  state.  The entrepreneurs'  strategy is  interest-led  as  they act  with  a  view to
realising  their  expectations.  This  does  not  mean  that  the  political  system  is
fundamentally put into question or weakened. Furthermore, entrepreneurs on the one
hand contribute to the reinforcement of state capacity, and on the other they make
efforts to steer it in a certain direction. Before drawing any conclusions on the impact
entrepreneurs have on state capacity we will examine the goals of the strategic groups
of entrepreneurs.
7 The Sixteenth Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in November 2002
decided that in the future private entrepreneurs would be allowed to join the Party. For
many years such a step would have been considered a violation of the statutes of the
Party.  The  lifting  of  this  ban  constitutes  the  end  of  a  long  development  of  the
classification of entrepreneurs from “class enemy” to social role model. The question
arises as to whether or not this development was initiated by an enlightened Party
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leadership or rather was the outcome of the strategic behaviour of the social actors
concerned.
Entrepreneurs: strategic groups with group interests
8 The  concept  of  strategic  groups  indicates  a  group  of  people  linked  by  a  common
interest  in  protecting  or  enhancing  their  common  chances  of  appropriation.
Appropriation  in  this  sense  does  not  refer  only  to  material  goods,  but  also  to
immaterial ones such as power, prestige, knowledge, etc. The members of such groups
share a distinct strategy of acting and the self-understanding to eventually constitute
on the long run an important social actor 8. Strategic groups are not solid classes, but
rather groups in a developing process which, by organising themselves in associations
act  in  a  potentially  strategic  way.  This  concept  also  reaches  beyond  the  ordinary
interest groups. Strategic groups do not intend to achieve limited interests within a
short time, but conceive themselves as an essential force in the balance of power of all
strategic groups within an entire society (9), that in the long run and interacting with
other  social  groups  wish  to  enforce  certain  economic,  social  and  even  political
purposes.
9 Strategic  groups  emerge  primarily  under  conditions  of  social  change  and
transformation, i.e. in periods with a high degree of social mobility. New social groups
and new opportunities  of  appropriation arise.  Strategic  groups  attempt  to  improve
those  opportunities  by  altering  and  reshaping  the  framework  to  suit  their  own
interests. Such activities are necessarily political, to the extent that strategic groups
could  be  classified  as  a  kind  of  political  actor.  Concurrently,  they  work  to  form
coalitions with other strategic groups.
10 The term ‘strategic’ refers to the designing and planned implementation of a long-term
overall  concept  with  the  purpose  of  realising  distinct  objectives,  such  as  material
interests (such as profit or material goods), symbolic (prestige) and cognitive interests
(values and self-realisation). Therefore, those aims are necessarily multi-dimensional,
as [since] not only economic, but also political and social objectives[,] are aimed for.
This multi-dimensionality is necessary, as optimal opportunities of appropriation and
development are not only guaranteed through acceptance of economic development
processes  by the state,  but  also make demands upon legal  and political  protection,
social acceptance and political influence.
11 If we apply the concept of strategic groups to the political arena, it becomes obvious
that a group with common features and collective interests and goals has the aim of
realising  those  goals  in  order  to  achieve  advantages  in  the  social  struggle  for
distribution (Verteilungskampf) and in the improvement of the framework necessary
to win that struggle. Certainly, it might be secondary depending on whether or not the
enforcement of interests and goals is pursued as a conscious strategy or in the form of
gradual collective actions with the aim of realising partial goals and partial strategies,
whereas more far-reaching strategic  goals  are achieved gradually.  According to the
respective options which a group possesses objectively and subjectively, its goal ranges
extend  between  the  poles  of  co-operative  system-inherent  and  system-opposing
behaviour.  Accordingly,  Evers  speaks  of  embeddedness  in  a  paradigm  of  power.
Strategic groups, he argues, possess the power to shape a society, an economy and a
political system in such a way that provides them the optimal preconditions for the
long-term appropriation of resources 10. By power we do not mean political power by
virtue of enforcing power in formal institutions or threat or refusal capacity, but rather
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informal power i.e., enforcement of interests outside formal enforcement hierarchies
as  well  as  to  the  consciousness  of  economic  power  in  order  to  shape  and  enforce
interests.
12 Chinese entrepreneurs exert power and influence by virtue of individual or collective
behaviour,  in  the  market  and  in  political  life.  Economically,  this  occurs  through
decisions  in  terms  of  investments,  location,  production  and  employment.  Such
decisions influence the political setting and thus political decisions on the local and
regional level. Socially they achieve this by offering donations and support, politically
through  networks,  guanxi,  institutional  participation  and  corruption.  This  may  be
exerted  individually  or  collectively,  e.g.  by  means  of  associations  or  interest
institutions.  Larger  entrepreneurs  occupy  official  positions  concurrently.  In
authoritarian states like China where active collective action is deemed to be sensitive
and  might  easily  be  outlawed,  particularly  in  the  political  domain,  entrepreneurs
perceive political forms of collective action merely to be the second best option.
13 Strategies are neither pursued in the interest of gaining political power nor do they
challenge that power. My own survey in China revealed that there are clear and various
strategies: growth strategies (in the interests of growth of a group or its organisations),
strategies of businesses (to enforce market or business interests), stability strategies (in the
interests  of  social  or  group  stabilisation),  politically  defensive  strategies (to  prevent
disadvantages), politically offensive strategies (to enforce formal or informal interests) or
a combination of strategies. As the selection of strateg(y/ies) depends on the concrete
situation, we cannot determine one unilinear or uniform behaviour of entrepreneurs as
a group.
14 In  fact,  entrepreneurs  do  not  form  a  unified  homogenous  group.  There  are  very
different categories  such as  large,  medium and small  entrepreneurs,  successful  and
unsuccessful,  or  entrepreneurs  who  move  on  a  scale  between  the  poles  of  active-
optimistic  and passive-pessimistic.  There are entrepreneurs from the local  Party or
government bureaucracy (origin: ‘cadre’) and who have high-level relationships, and
those  without  such  relationships.  There  are  push  entrepreneurs  who  became  self-
employed because they were dissatisfied with the working conditions in their earlier
company, and pull entrepreneurs who are attracted by the entrepreneurial effect and
its social and financial possibilities, and who consequently gave up their jobs. We can
subdivide these too, according to reason for choosing self-employment as follows: (a)
the use of market opportunities and market incentives (above all in urban areas and in
more  developed  regions);  (b)  due  to  blocked  opportunities to  climb  the  ladder  (self-
employment as an alternative path for social upward mobility); (c) advantages from
opportunities (privileges and social relationships) by members of the political elite and
sub-elite (above all at the local level); or (d) survival strategies (unemployed, pensioners)
11.  Therefore, strategies and strategic goals may vary according to a situation and a
group’s features 12.
15 Strategic groups or their representatives have to be able to process information, to
formulate groups' objectives, to put forward and implement goal-oriented decisions.
The collecting of strategic information and strategic analyses, strategic planning and
the implementation of that planning are necessary attributes of strategic groups and
their  interest  organisations. The  primary  purpose  of  strategic  planning is  to  select
measures that ensure achievement of the objective envisaged 13.
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16 Here, not only the particular importance of an interest organisation that enables the
long-term  pursuing  of  targets  becomes  evident,  but  also  the  importance  of  the
leadership of  a  strategic group having the necessary meta-cognition at  its  disposal.
Strategic implementation might not always take place in a rational and thought-out
manner, and can be spontaneous and unstructured in the initial phase. This implies
that strategic acting is not an a priori existing feature, but is rather a learning process
implementing  itself  in  an  interaction  between  organisation  and group  as  well  as
between organisation and environment 14. Thus, the notion of strategy reaches beyond
its original military meaning [acceptation], meaning rather a programme’s strategy. In
this way it comes close to the concept of policy.
17 To summarise, the concept of strategic groups seems to be the best to characterise the
phenomenon of  entrepreneurs  as  a  social  group in  China  today.  Five  elements  are
crucial in determining a strategic group: 1. A group possesses an important function for
the development of the entire society and for its political change and development. 2. It
acts by means of an organised interest group with political bargaining capacity. 3. It
acts strategically in the above-mentioned sense and possesses capabilities for formal
and  informal  strategic  enforcement.  4.  The  interest  organisations  possess  strategic
knowledge,  strategic  planning ability and a capacity to implement this  planning.  5.
Habits and attitudes of the groups' members have an effect on value-building and value
change.
18 The latter point in particular reveals that entrepreneurs are not only collective actors
but  also  collective  symbols.  Keller  pointed  to  three  levels  of  those  symbols:  cognitive
symbols (professionalism  and  knowledge),  moral  symbols (values  and  attitudes)  and
expressive symbols (emotions, modes of behaviour) 15. Thus, entrepreneurs are examples
for society and individuals, either as models or as bearers of hope. On the one hand
they act collectively by means of their interest organisation, on the other hand they are
symbolically  representing  economic  authority,  professionalism,  economic  decision-
making,  entrepreneurial  success,  wealth  and  a  distinct  lifestyle.  The  symbolism
includes specific moral expectations (employer offering employment, fostering social
welfare,  social-oriented  behaviour),  distinct  perceptions  of  values  and  order.  The
creation  of  such  a  symbolic  character  might  be  explained  by  means  of  a  concrete
example. In the Renmin Ribao, the Party mouthpiece, an entrepreneur at the end of 1999
argued  that  entrepreneurs  of  the  twenty-first  century  had  to  act  as  politicians
(zhengzhijia), thinkers (sixiangjia) and artists (yishujia) at the same time: as politicians, as
their  acting  was  inseparably  linked  to  politics  in  the  sense  of  participating  in  the
creation  of  a  political  and  legal  framework;  as  thinkers,  as  the  development  of  an
enterprise would depend on the entrepreneur's philosophy, and as artists, as they had
to  approach  people  with  empathy  and  understanding  16.  As  in  many  press  articles
written  by  entrepreneurs  the  universal,  strategic  and  exemplary  character  of
entrepreneurship is emphasised, thus creating a role of a social model. The concept of
strategic groups, besides strategic acting, contains the feature of strategic symbolism
(entrepreneurs as symbols of a distinct behaviour and particular values).
19 The strategic-active  part  of  entrepreneurship  refers  to  larger,  more  important  and
better-educated  entrepreneurs,  often  inhabiting  public  functions.  This  segment  of
entrepreneurship  is  more  self-confident  than  smaller  businesspeople,  especially  if
people from the upper strata are involved. The more confident people are the more
pro-active manner and the more energetic they are in realising their interests in a
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strategic  way.  It  is  this  group  that  comprises  the  core  of  a  strategic  elite  with  a
leadership function and that takes over the function of accepted spokespersons and
representatives  of  the  collective  strategic  group  of  entrepreneurs.  Undoubtedly,
entrepreneurs are developing into an economic elite, though not automatically into a
strategic  one.  Social  climbers,  i.e.  people  lower  down  the  social  ladder,  individual
labourers or people once classified as political or social deviants often hesitate or are
afraid  about  becoming  involved  politically  or  socially,  and  attempt  to  behave  in  a
politically conformist manner. Chinese investigations reveal that individual (i.e. very
small-scale) entrepreneurs (getihu) are more inclined to conceive politics as something
negative (e.g.  ‘politics is a bad thing’ or ‘politics is the concern of a small minority
only’) and thus tend to be politically more indifferent than larger entrepreneurs.
20 The critique that the strategic group approach refers to an indistinct unit of reference
does not apply to our group of actors, as despite all differences entrepreneurs consist of
a  distinctly  differentiated  group  with  similar  features  of  identification.  Thus,  they
differ from vague group concepts like ‘middle classes’ or ‘bureaucracy’ and might be
classified  in  an  analytically  distinct  manner.  Certainly,  this  does  not  mean that  as
individuals  they  think  and  act  in  a  uniform  way,  but  rather  that  they  organise
themselves  in  interest  associations,  thus  attempting  to  implement  and  achieve
common goals. Those interest associations represent the will and necessity of collective
acting of entrepreneurs 17. The formation of a strategic group is a process. As far as our
case is concerned, the process of entrepreneur group formation is not yet finished, but
is rather an ongoing process, as an entrepreneurship is still an emerging status.
21 Group objectives
22 In order to substantiate our argument that the enforcement of common goals affects
state capacity, first of all we have to identify group objectives of entrepreneurs. The
concept  of  ‘strategy’  implies  that  a  group  attempts  to  enforce  group  targets  in  a
planned or spontaneous manner. Certainly, Olson has in principle called into question
whether or not groups pursue collective aims, as they were characterised, ‘by the fact
that, if one member does or does not help provide the collective good, no one other
member will be significantly affected and therefore none has any reason to react. Thus
an individual in a 'latent' group...cannot make a noticeable contribution to any group
effort, and since no one in the group will react if he makes no contribution, he has no
incentive to contribute’ 18.
23 This  means  that  rational  individuals  would  enjoy  a  free  ride  in  such  institutions.
Common interests  do exist,  but  they do not  necessarily  lead to mobilisation of  the
group, something that was classified as ‘collective action dilemma’ 19. Yet, the similarity
of interests makes such groups potential groups for organisation and mobilisation. The
Chinese  pattern  of  development  might  validate  that  view.  Initially,  an
entrepreneurship emerged spontaneously and in deviation from official policies. The
aim to make large profits as quickly as possible fostered thinking ability in individual-
oriented  categories  of  entrepreneurs,  particularly  under  conditions  of  long-term
economic uncertainty, and in addition, the need to adapt to the political conditions and
to develop guanxi and networks for business success. But if we turn to the processual
character of entrepreneurship, we receive a more relativised picture. The history of the
revitalisation of private entrepreneurship could be classified in the following phases: a)
existence  of  a  shadow economy;  b)  efforts  to  be  officially  accepted;  c)  substituting
political with economic control (20); and d) legal protection and equality. Meanwhile,
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entrepreneurship  is  no  longer  part  of  the  shadow economy,  acceptance  is  steadily
increasing,  substitution  by  economic  leverages  for  political  leverages  and  legal
protection have made significant progress. At present it is the themes of legal security,
political participation and political equality that matter, the common collective goods
in which private entrepreneurs are mostly interested.
24 Organisational  capability  as  a  precondition  of  effective  organisation  in  interest
associations demands three essential features: continuity of interest pursuance (in order
to achieve a goal), urgency of realisation of interests, and common ground of interests.
The  organisation  of  entrepreneurs  in  interest  associations  is  a  manifestation  of  a
group's consciousness or, as far as forced membership exists, it fosters the emergence
of such a consciousness. Our interviews demonstrate that entrepreneurs, by means of
those organisations, pursue the goal of enforcing common interests and aims through
continuous acting 21.
25 Organisational capability in the sense of the above-mentioned three features has grown
by means of the following factors:
• Through forced membership in quasi state- or authority-controlled organisations. Hence,
entrepreneurs were embedded in a trans-entrepreneurial context that resulted in the
emergence of new networks, co-operation and sources of information. Concurrently, among
some entrepreneurs a common identity was generated: the realisation that common
interests and performance are necessary and that interest organisations―particularly self-
administered ones―were indispensable. Collective identity in that sense is defined by
shared definitions of a group that ‘derive from members’ common interests and solidarity’ 
22.
• The acceptance of the private sector by the state, its legal equality and ideological
acceptance, finally its economic success has fostered confidence among entrepreneurs and
the setting-up of mobilising activities aimed at raising its social and political prestige by
means of the media and various institutional channels.
• Persistent intervention in entrepreneurial activities by local authorities, widespread
corruption, the discrepancy between the supporting policies of the central authorities and
the provinces on the one hand, and the sometimes rigid behaviour of local authorities on the
other lead to high costs that in the long term are detrimental to the development of
enterprises. ‘Arbitrariness cannot be overcome by individual actions alone’, as one
entrepreneur argued. The interaction of political acceptance (at the central level), economic
and social necessity (private sector as the most dynamic sector which from the perspective
of employment and tax income is indispensable), and entrepreneurial confidence foster the
organisational process too. Not a few entrepreneurs realised that organisation is not only
confined to consultation, i.e. transmitting economic opinions to the authorities, but also
lobbying has to be done and economic and regulatory policies (Ordnungspolitik) have to be
influenced in the interest of entrepreneurs.
How group aims are enforced
26 By means of some case studies, e.g. by means of strategic efforts of entrepreneurs in
terms of  legal  security,  I  will  demonstrate  in  which manner entrepreneurs  enforce
group  objectives  and  thus  attempt  to  have  an  impact  upon  the  framework  and
direction of state capacity. At the sessions of the National People's Congress and the
National People's Consultative Conference 23 in March 1998 a majority of those deputies
who are private entrepreneurs voted for an alteration of the constitution in terms of a
constitutional  equalisation  of  the  private  sector.  This  was  justified  by  the  benefits
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which  this  sector  brings  to  the  national  economy  and  employment  as  well  as  the
increase in export capacities and foreign exchange. Concurrently, the establishing of a
'Bureau for Private Economy' was suggested, in order to raise the status of that sector
within the administration and to offer the option of using that bureau in order to aid
the pursuance of interests. An entrepreneur, deputy of the National People's Congress
argued vis-à-vis the author of this paper:
For  many  years  we  have  strived  for  the  equal  acceptance  of  this  sector.  This
equality should be written into the Constitution. For us this is an important goal
that implies a certain degree of political and legal security in the event it is actually
realised.  Primarily  we  attempted  to  convince  them  in  the  framework  of  the
Association of Industry and Commerce and in many discussions with the United
Front  Department  of  the  Central  Committee  of the  Party  [the  department
responsible for that association]. Certainly, we are discussing this among ourselves
and thus reaching an agreement on how to argue and how to proceed. Our activities
as deputies make access to political leaders and influential personalities possible
and provide us with the opportunity to put forward and explain our opinions and to
ask for support. This is the Chinese and our way of politics. It enables us to assert
our opinions gradually and to shape policies in our own interests 24.
27 As important bearers of state capacity it is not only the state, but also the Party that is
the  target  of  entrepreneurial  acting.  In  Zhongguo  Gongshang  Bao,  a  daily  newspaper
published by the National Bureau for the Administration of Industry and Commerce
with a weekly supplement for the private economic sector that claims to be the ‘voice’
of  entrepreneurs,  entrepreneurs  frequently  stress  that  their  interests  should  be
represented  within  the  Party.  In  another  contribution  entitled,  ‘We  want  Party
representatives’,  published  by  the  Xinhua  news  agency,  it  was  argued  that  the
economic importance of entrepreneurship within the general development strategy of
the  country  would  require  such  a  step.  The  argumentation  was  accompanied  by
ideological  support:  ‘It  is  the reform and opening policy initiated by the Party that
provided us with all we have gained till today. Only if we go along with the Party the
road will become broader and broader’ 25.
28 Here  an  analysis  is  used  to  illustrate  the  legal  framework  according  to  which
entrepreneurs  pursue  strategic  goals  beneficial  to  them,  thus  affecting  the  state's
capacity in the area of law. Market economy and its opening policy require new rules.
The private sector needs legal protection in order to develop. Political protection has to
be replaced by legal protection. Laws need legal institutions in order to be enforceable.
Integration  into  the  global  economy and  economic  globalisation  require  increasing
adaptation in terms of international legal norms and standards. Entrepreneurs are not
the sole actors but rather those who are most interested in a stable and solid economic
law,  as  their  enterprises  cannot  develop  and  consolidate  without  such  laws.  The
emergence of entrepreneurship was beneficial to the further change of a law culture:
until  the 1990s it  was not individual entrepreneurs or entrepreneurs with property
rights, but rather the enterprise as an institution 26 that according to the law was a
legal  subject.  Meanwhile  it  is  accepted  in  China  that  entrepreneurs  have  to  be
supported  by  laws  which  safeguard  their  interests  and  their  economic  activities
effectively,  and  to  prevent  the  exit of  private  entrepreneurs  from  economic  life.
Therefore,  it  is  no  longer  corporate  economic  law  that  counts,  but  increasingly
individual economic rights. The latter have to be discerned as a preliminary stage of
the discussion on individual rights.
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29 In the last two decades a large variety of laws have been promulgated. Undoubtedly,
those laws have a double function: they provide legal protection, and they illustrate the
efforts of the state to control the private sector by means of legal instruments instead
of arbitrary decisions. In this sense, legal rights are not concerned with justice, but
rather with control by the use of laws. This is what is meant by ‘rule by law’ (yi fa zhi
guo)  in contrast to ‘rule of law’ 27.  The former implies the exercise of Party rule by
means  of  laws  and rights  in  order  to  reduce  the  arbitrariness  of  power;  the  latter
represents the state under the rule of law, characterised by subordination of any form
of political power to the law.
30 The role of law and of legislation in authoritarian single-party states was for a long
time  neglected  by the  social  sciences.  It  was  believed  that  rights  and  law  were
controlled by the political elite and merely functioned to legitimise political power.
Certainly, this might have been true for the era under Mao. During the reform era,
significant changes occurred. There is no doubt that since the 1980s no country has
enacted more laws than China. Concurrently, the legal system was differentiated, e.g. in
terms of jurisdiction and the admission of lawyers.
31 The legislative institution, the National People's Congress,  enhanced its competence
and power. In recent years this has been demonstrated by the increasing number of
rejections or far-reaching revisions of official resolutions, as well as by the growing
number  of  dissenting  votes.  The  increasing  fragmentation  of  decision-making  is
interconnected to the growing pluralisation of society, the stronger separation of Party
and state, the representation of new interest groups in the People's Congresses at all
levels  and  a  changing  political  culture  of  the  deputies. Social  differentiation  and
pluralisation  are  reflected  in  attitudes  and  behaviour  of  deputies  who  act  more
confidently, are interest group-oriented and less obligated to the Party. By transferring
important, elder Party leaders into the leadership of the National People's Congress
(NPC) who established a new power arena within and by means of that institution, the
function of the Congress was reinforced.
32 The fragmentation of power has contributed to this. The differentiation of society and
of  the  tasks  of  Party  and  state  had  the  effect  such  that  the  NPC  could  take  over
competences in fields that were considered to be secondary in terms of the political
system. The same holds for legality, insofar as it has no contra-systemic effects, i.e. so
long as it is not directed against the power of the Party. Certainly, the Party leadership
is the last  resort of  decision-making,  but meanwhile it  tolerates moderate forms of
dissent. Therefore, state and Party are less a structure but rather a process. Neither the
Party nor the State Council or the People's Congress constitute an unity, but have to be
deconstructed in vertical (regional, local) and horizontal entities (Party, State Council,
NPC,  Political  Consultative  Conferences,  etc.)  interacting  with  each  other  and
permanently  changing.  It  is  this  that  constitutes  the  processive  character
(Prozesscharakter) of those institutions. Tanner, accordingly, speaks of three arenas in
legislative  procedures:  People's  Congress,  State  Council  and  Party  leadership.  The
Political  Consultative  Conference  is  an  ally  of  the  People's  Congress  as  it  operates
relatively  independently,  is  not  so  strictly  controlled  and  possesses  a  merely
consultative  function,  though it  is  concurrently  embedded in consultative  decision-
making processes.
33 Tanner refers to the ‘Garbage Can’  model of  Cohen, Olson and March,  according to
which complex organisations temporarily constitute a form of organised anarchy. Such
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organised anarchies  are  characterised by  indistinct  goal  hierarchies.  The system of
decision-making  is  inefficient,  as  now  distinct  rules  and  procedures  for  decision-
making are established. Decision insecurity was prevalent among the actors involved,
and it  became impossible  to predict  decisions.  Furthermore,  the principal  actors  of
decision-making  were  not  unequivocally  and  regularly  participating  in  decision-
making. Tanner compares the Chinese legislative process with this form of organised
anarchy arguing that the differentiation of the social system dissolves vertical decision-
making  processes  in  interactive  and  bargaining  systems  and  disperses  power  and
decision-making processes 28. This hypothesis seems to prove right in practice.
34 Let  us  look  at  the  process  of  interest  representation  of  entrepreneurs  in  terms  of
legislation.  The Zhongguo  Gongshang Bao reported on a  law protecting the economic
rights and interests of private economy that by means of the Association of Industry
and Commerce was put forward to the national congress of the Political Consultative
Conference  in  spring  1998.  In  the  application  it  was  argued  in  a  tactically  clever
manner: the Association [and not the entrepreneurs!] would hold the opinion that the
non-public economy which had been declared to be an important part of the socialist
market economy [by the Fifteenth Party Congress] had developed to a certain degree.
Political  support  alone  was  no  longer  sufficient,  but  instead  legal  protection  was
required. Had it not been argued this way it would be difficult to implement the policy
of the Party in a stability-oriented and resolute way. Ownership and the property of
those concerned should enjoy legal protection. Illegal interference was detrimental to
the further ‘healthy’ development of the private sector. Only public but not private
ownership  was  protected  by  the Constitution.  Fortunately,  Canton  had  issued  a
respective  law  securing  autonomous  operation  of  private  businesses,  intellectual
property, investment, employment rights, foreign trade rights, private property and
other rights. This law, so argued the Association, should be transferred to the national
level 29.
35 Procedurally,  an  institution  strongly  attached  to  the  Party,  i.e.  the  Association  of
Industry  and  Commerce,  attached  to  the  United  Front  Department  of  the  Central
Committee of the CCP, was taken advantage of to put forward a resolution to a weighty
central  institution,  the Political  Consultative Conference.  Private entrepreneurs and
private  economy  was  not  mentioned  by  name.  It  seems  to  be  a  resolution  of  the
Association that it has the sole aim of securing legal equality of the non-state economic
sector earlier on decided by the Party. This, so the argument went, was last but not
least in the interests of the national economy. As innovations always require a long
discussion process, the existence of a concrete ‘example’ makes the achievement much
easier.
36 And this example existed already in Canton. Following the genesis of that development,
we found that after the Fourteenth Party Congress (which decided the legal equality of
the public and non-public sectors) the Association of Industry and Commerce had put
forward a proposal backed by entrepreneurs to the Political Consultative Conference of
Canton.  This  proposal  suggested putting the private and state-owned sectors on an
equal  footing,  and  finally  gained  the  approval  of  a  majority  of  deputies.  After
consultations  between  representatives  of  the  city's  leadership,  of  the  Political
Consultative  Conference  and  of  the  Association  of  Industry  and  Commerce  the
resolution was passed on to the People's Congress of the city. Concurrently, the United
Front Department of the city Party Committee was persuaded to prepare a respective
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resolution  to  the  city's  Party  committee.  Both  the  Party  committee  and  the city
government approved the respective document. 
37 After the decision of the Fifteenth Party Congress that declared the private sector to be
part of the socialist sector, Canton, following the line of the central leadership, released
the  Regulations  Protecting  the  Legal  Rights  of  Private  Entrepreneurs  30.  This  was
primarily to protect the legal  rights,  the property,  ownership,  and the autonomous
management of entrepreneurs. Yet such legal protection at the same time strengthens
their  social  and  political  prestige,  and  is  a  protection  against  arbitrariness  and
infringements of rights by local authorities. As a first step this did not occur at the
relatively  abstract  national  or  provincial  level,  but  at  the  level  of  a  city  which for
entrepreneurs  is  politically  much  closer.  This  action  was  so  successful  that  the
organised entrepreneurship proposed a corresponding protection at provincial level
that was finally negotiated with the provincial government. In July 1999 the respective
regulation became operative 31. Thus, by the same procedure, the Canton regulations
were  transferred to  the  provincial  level,  and Guangdong became the first  province
legally protecting specific rights of private entrepreneurs.
38 The development of this legislation reveals that there exists an organised and strategic
associational policy of entrepreneurs. As such acts (legal equality) concern the interests
of all entrepreneurs, this may be considered as a strategic policy in the interests of the
entire  social  group  of  entrepreneurs.  Such  an  interaction  of  formal  and  informal
influences, combining various interests confirms Tanner's thesis of the existence of an
organised anarchy.
39 The policy of petitions is a further example of deliberate and strategic action. Zhongguo
Gongshang  Bao for  instance  reported  on  petitions  of  deputies  of  the  Political
Consultative Conference at its spring session in 1998. Besides the revision of existing
regulations  for  the  private  sector,  drafts  were  put  forward  demanding  more  far-
reaching rights for attracting foreign investment, going public, and employment. Other
deputies called for special  ‘offices for small  and medium enterprises’  that in future
should  be  responsible  for  the  administration  of  the  private  sector.  They  should
elaborate the policies and legal regulations for this sector and look after the protection
of its rights and their implementation, the obtaining of credits,  information supply,
further  education,  product  advertisement,  problem  solutions,  administration  of
entrepreneurial associations as well as adjusting the relationship vis-à-vis state- and
collectively-owned enterprises 32.
40 Contrary  to  the  State  Bureau  for  Administration  of  Industry  and  Commerce  which
currently is responsible for the administration of the private sector, such offices would,
among  other  things,  exclusively  take  care  of  private  enterprises.  Due  to  various
interconnections between authorities and entrepreneurs, it could be used by the latter
to enforce interests via the authorities and thus improve bargaining power vis-à-vis the
bureaucracy.  Other  entrepreneurs  appealed  for  the  establishment  of  Party
organisations  within  enterprises  and  the  accepting  of  more  entrepreneurial  Party
members (aim: ‘to reinforce the function of the Party in private enterprises’) 33. Such a
proposal  was  supported  by  areas  of  entrepreneurship.  The  reason  was  that  a
corresponding decision would have made it  easier to accept entrepreneurs as Party
members which in fact was not yet permitted, but widely practiced at that time. Thus,
it  would  have  been  much  easier  for  entrepreneurs  to  join  Party  networks,  and
consequently this would have increased the political acceptance of the private sector.
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41 In sum, currently the status quo shows that entrepreneurs primarily are concerned
with  the  extension  and  protection  of  their  economic  rights  as  well  as  with  the
stabilisation  of  their  business.  In  order  to  reduce  uncertainty  and  to  minimise
transaction costs, they are interested in strengthening law and law security. This, at
present, determines their political-strategic performance. This is certainly not unusual,
as the enterprise is the basis of an entrepreneur's livelihood. A Chinese survey among
entrepreneurs asking for their pivotal concern revealed that the principal concern was
the  development  of  their  business.  The  second  largest  concern  was  the  irksome
problem of guanxi (guanxi mafan), third came corruption 34. This demonstrates that the
existence of  those  system-endemic  problems  are  by  no  means  part  of  a  ‘Chinese
enterprise culture’, but is rather conceived as a tremendous burden.
42 From  a  political  point  of  view  it  might  be  questionable  to  speak  already  of  an
unambiguous ‘strategic acting’ of entrepreneurs, as such an acting would have been
politically goal-oriented and had to be pursued in an organised manner. Accordingly,
co-operations and agreements with other entrepreneurs, establishing and mobilising
connections and networks as well as political activities in formal institutions (Party,
People's  Congresses,  etc.)  entirely  serve  the  purpose  of  having  an  impact  on  the
framework and to arrange the situation of the entrepreneurs and their enterprises as
favourably as possible. This is also true for the political arena, albeit the organisation of
participation currently is a crucial strategic aim. The organisational media for this are
the existing associations which in the framework of state and Party policy cautiously
define economic objectives at local and national level. This includes demands such as
those that the Association of Private Enterprises (which is under the Bureau for the
Administration  of  Industry  and  Commerce)  should  be  turned  into  an  ‘independent
juridical  person’  35 acting  as  a  purely  autonomous  interest  organisation  of  private
entrepreneurs without any interference from the authorities 36. Membership in those
associations should become voluntary, not enforced 37. 
Entrepreneurs and state capacity
43 I  have  examined  how  entrepreneurs  are  continuously  attempting  to  alter  the
framework and direction of state capacity. Reform and liberalisation processes were
principal preconditions for that. The latter has restructured the political priorities and
goal  orientation  and  enabled  new  social  actors  to  articulate  interests  in  a  more
beneficial  manner,  has reinforced their  bargaining power and thus their  impact on
state capacity. Thus, entrepreneurs increasingly were discerned as a principal element
of the socialist system and no longer as a political opponent or a politically doubtful
group. Last but not least the promotion of the private sector and entrepreneurship was
accepted in  the  interests  of  modernisation.  Strategic  acting,  containing  formal  and
informal  features,  emerged  by  means  of  organisation.  This  did  not  weaken  state
capacities, but in turn improved them.
44 Recalling the above-mentioned five elements of state capacity (legitimacy, regulating
and controlling capacity, resources for enforcement, bargaining capacity and learning
capacity),  the following could be ascertained: The legitimacy in terms of state and
Party  on  the  central  level  has  increased  due  to  political  and  legal  acceptance  of
entrepreneurship by the central political leadership, though entrepreneurs are highly
critical vis-à-vis local authorities. Our own surveys among entrepreneurs support this
critical view 38.
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45 The  regulating  and  control  capacity  in  terms  of  social  and  political  control  and
regulation  has  grown  as  the  state  has  not  only  accepted  the  existence  of
entrepreneurial  associations,  but  also  succeeded in  including them in  a  corporatist
manner.  The  personnel  policy  within  the  entrepreneurs'  associations  and  their
inclusion  in  political  institutions  (People's  Congresses,  Political  Consultative
Conferences, Village Administration Committees) as well as Party membership and the
establishing of Party organisations in private enterprises are important resources for
enforcement,  though  the  effects  of  those  matters  remain  to  be  seen.  Our  own
investigations prove that entrepreneurs use official positions and party membership in
a  strategic  way  and,  where  Party  organisations  exist,  dominate  them  in  their
enterprises.
46 Bargaining capacity improved as entrepreneurs obtained the opportunity to bargain or
negotiate  rights  and  patterns  of  participation.  In  addition,  the  state  displayed  its
learning capacity or readiness to learn by means of his supportive policies towards the
private sector and entrepreneurs. I argue that the revision of the framework and of the
direction of  state capacity is  accepted by the state,  as  long as state capacity is  not
principally put into question by entrepreneurs, for instance by the demand of changing
the political system. This is the intention, as the Party leadership is hopefully to
reinforce state capacity instead of weakening it.
47 That the goal-orientation and direction of state capacity has changed is proved by the
fact  that  meanwhile  entrepreneurs  are  accepted  as  equal  players,  that  their
entrepreneurial rights are protected, that interest associations are admitted and Party
membership is guaranteed. As I have shown above, the interaction of strategic acting of
an organised entrepreneurship on the one side and a political leadership accepting the
strategic and transformational operating of entrepreneurs on the other generated this
change  of  direction.  The  political  leadership  has  permitted  and  tolerated  that
entrepreneurs influence policies in their own interests and thus participate politically.
Last but not least this is an expression of the fact that the political leadership no longer
may  be  perceived  as  a  representative  of  a  policy  defined  by  class  interests,  but
increasingly as an autonomous force acting in the interests of all social groups or in the
interests of the nation. Therefore, the above-mentioned concept of the existence of an
embedded autonomy, according to which the state acts independently of  particular
interests, but concurrently finds itself embedded in distinct social relations that link
state and society and make the implementation of policies possible, proves right in our
context.
48 The acceptance of the strategic and transformational potential of entrepreneurs and
their inclusion in political bargaining processes by Party and state is to be seen as a
direct expression of the embedded autonomy. Thus, state capacity gained acceptance
among entrepreneurs, too. Where a state protects their rights and proves to be capable
to learn, entrepreneurs acknowledge that a state possesses legitimate state capacity.
Concurrently, entrepreneurs establish ‘advocacy coalitions’ in order to better impact
upon the policy process 39.
49 Certainly, the capacity pattern exhibits an ambiguous picture: from the perspective of
actors (entrepreneurs) as well as of the central state, capacity has increased. Yet the
strategy of entrepreneurs alters the framework and its direction. It will be the task of
future research to examine the outcome of this ratio and to define the consequences
for the political system.
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